September, 2026
Abstract
Understanding whether an individual is ideologically compatible with another person cannot be reduced to religious identity, political affiliation, personal appearance, isolated statements, or membership in a broad religious community. A more rigorous framework distinguishes among mentality, ideology, social network, and conduct, and then examines the degree to which these dimensions correspond over time. Research on terrorism and violent extremism indicates that individuals who enter violent ideological movements can be influenced by interacting processes involving significance, grievance, identity, social networks, ideological narratives, moral justification, and group reinforcement. At the same time, the evidence does not support the proposition that terrorists constitute a single psychological type or that mental illness is a sufficient explanation for terrorist involvement (Borum, 2004; Sarma et al., 2022).
A central analytical problem is the distance between belief and behaviour. Strong ideological commitment may be associated with radical behaviour, but radical belief alone is not a reliable proxy for violent intent. A 2025 study using 2,103 cases in the Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States found that ideological commitment was associated with radical behaviour and civil disobedience, but not, for the full sample, with increased likelihood of violent plot involvement or direct violence. The study did, however, find a positive association between commitment and radical behaviour and violence within the jihadist-inspired subset, illustrating both the relevance of ideological commitment and the limits of generalization (Callahan & Rosenfeld, 2025).
Accordingly, the proposition that actions speak louder than words should be refined rather than rejected. Words reveal declared commitments; actions reveal operational commitments; repeated conduct reveals stable behavioural patterns; and ideology explains the normative framework through which conduct is justified. The strongest evidence of ideological practice arises where expressed beliefs, principles, decisions, and repeated conduct substantially converge.
For interpersonal compatibility, the relevant question is consequently not merely “What does this person say they believe?” It is also “What does the person’s worldview require, permit, prohibit, or justify when their beliefs conflict with the autonomy, dignity, beliefs, or interests of other people?” Compatibility therefore depends less on similarity of religious identity than on whether the person’s governing moral framework permits reciprocal autonomy, legitimate disagreement, equal human dignity, restraint against coercion, and rejection of ideological violence.
1. The Analytical Problem: From Identity to Mentality, Ideology, and Conduct
The study of terrorism has progressively moved away from the idea that terrorism can be explained through a single personality type, a psychiatric abnormality, or an inherently pathological individual disposition. Borum’s comprehensive review of the psychological literature found no reliable “terrorist personality” and emphasized the importance of social, psychological, ideological, and situational processes. Later systematic evidence has likewise found no basis for assuming that terrorist populations, as a whole, are characterized by unusually high rates of mental disorder compared with the general population (Borum, 2004; Sarma et al., 2022).
That point is important because an individual’s identity and ideology are not interchangeable concepts. A person can be Muslim without being Islamist; Islamist without being jihadist; politically radical without supporting terrorism; strongly religious without accepting political violence; or dissatisfied with a government without endorsing an extremist movement.
The categories therefore need to remain analytically separate.
| Concept | Meaning in this analysis | What it does not establish by itself |
|---|---|---|
| Religious identity | Membership in or identification with a religion | Commitment to violent extremism |
| Religious observance | Prayer, dietary rules, dress, worship, ritual, etc. | Support for jihadist organizations |
| Political radicalism | Strong opposition to prevailing institutions or policies | Willingness to use violence |
| Ideological extremism | Commitment to an absolutist or exclusionary worldview | Terrorist behaviour automatically |
| Jihadist ideology | A specific violent Islamist ideological tradition | Islam as a whole |
| Violent extremism | Advocacy, preparation for, support for, or participation in ideologically motivated violence | Mental illness |
| Terrorist conduct | Actual criminal or violent activity associated with terrorism | Any particular religious or ethnic identity |
Bunzel (2015) describes jihadist-Salafism as a distinct ideological current within Sunni Islam rather than a synonym for Sunni Islam as a whole. Lahoud (2010) similarly analyzes jihadism as an ideological movement with particular propositions concerning political authority, state legitimacy, religious boundaries, and violence.
This distinction is not merely terminological. It determines whether evidence is being interpreted responsibly. A proxy characteristic should not be substituted for the phenomenon one is actually trying to understand.
A sound assessment therefore proceeds from:
Identity → beliefs → normative rules → social reinforcement → decisions → repeated conduct → consequences.
The objective is not to produce a psychological diagnosis or predict who will become violent. It is to understand whether an ideology is actually operative in a person’s behaviour and relationships.
2. Jihadi Psychology: How Ordinary Psychological Processes Can Be Organized Around Extremist Beliefs
The expression jihadi psychology should not be interpreted as describing a unique psychiatric condition. The evidence instead points to ordinary psychological mechanisms that can become organized around an absolutist ideological narrative and reinforced by a highly cohesive social network (Borum, 2004; Bélanger et al., 2019; Kruglanski et al., 2021).
A 2026 systematic literature review similarly identified interacting micro-, meso-, and macro-level factors in radicalization research. Its micro-level factors included ideological beliefs, intolerance, hostile attitudes, conspiracy mentality, moral disengagement, and psychological characteristics; meso-level factors included social isolation, family dysfunction, perceived intergroup threat, low social support, and psychological needs. The study emphasizes that radicalization is better understood as a multilevel process than as the consequence of one isolated variable (Pandey & Behera, 2026).
2.1 Need: significance, belonging, status, and meaning
The 3N model developed by Bélanger et al. (2019) organizes radicalization toward violence around Need, Narrative, and Network. The “Need” component concerns a quest for personal significance: the desire to matter, to possess purpose, and to be respected by people whose opinions are important to the individual. A perceived loss of significance can arise through rejection, humiliation, failure, social alienation, or other experiences that challenge identity and status.
The important qualification is that these experiences are not sufficient causes of extremism. Millions of people experience rejection, injustice, failure, humiliation, or social isolation without becoming violent extremists. The relevant psychological mechanism is the interaction between vulnerability and an ideological narrative that offers an answer to that vulnerability.
The extremist organization can therefore provide several things simultaneously:
| Psychological condition | Extremist response |
|---|---|
| “I do not matter.” | “You can become important to a historic cause.” |
| “I do not belong.” | “You belong to an elite community of the righteous.” |
| “My life lacks purpose.” | “Your life has a sacred or revolutionary mission.” |
| “I have suffered an injustice.” | “Your suffering is evidence that an enemy must be fought.” |
| “I have lost status.” | “Commitment to the cause can restore honour and recognition.” |
The importance of this process is psychological rather than theological. The ideology supplies a meaning-making structure capable of transforming personal dissatisfaction into collective purpose.
2.2 Narrative: converting grievance into moral certainty
The second “N” is the Narrative. The ideological narrative explains why the individual is suffering, who is responsible, who belongs to the righteous community, what constitutes betrayal, and what actions are supposedly necessary.
Bélanger et al. (2019) found evidence for a process in which social alienation was related to support for political violence, which was in turn related to attraction to like-minded groups. Their work also implicated moral justification as one mechanism through which alienation can become associated with support for political violence.
This is where grievance becomes more consequential. The ideological narrative can transform:
“Something is wrong”
into:
“Someone is responsible.”
and then into:
“Therefore violence against that person or group is morally permissible.”
The final step is not inevitable. It is the critical ideological transformation that researchers attempt to explain.
2.3 Network: the social validation of the worldview
The third element is the Network. A group supplies social validation, shared language, belonging, recognition, and reinforcement. The group can make an individual’s previously uncertain beliefs appear obvious and unquestionable.
Kruglanski et al. (2021) describe ideological obsession as involving mutually reinforcing processes, including weakening of ordinary moral self-regulation, increased sensitivity to criticism of the ideology, gravitation toward like-minded networks, and resistance to information that challenges the ideological worldview.
The significance of the network is therefore not simply friendship. It may become the individual’s epistemic authority—the principal source through which the person decides what is true, who can be trusted, and how events should be interpreted.
3. The Extremist Mentality: From “Us Versus Them” to Moral Exclusion
One of the most significant psychological transformations involves the construction of an increasingly rigid in-group/out-group distinction.
Ordinary social identity contains group boundaries. People distinguish family from strangers, citizens from non-citizens, religious communities from other religious communities, and political allies from opponents. Such distinctions are not themselves pathological or extremist.
The relevant transformation occurs when the distinction becomes morally absolute.
The conceptual progression can be represented as follows:
Difference → disagreement → opposition → illegitimacy → dehumanization → moral exclusion → justified coercion or violence.
Not every extremist group moves through every stage, and not every person who makes an “us versus them” distinction reaches the final stages. Nevertheless, the literature identifies moral disengagement, dehumanization, and ideological justification as important mechanisms in violent extremism (Bélanger et al., 2019; Kruglanski et al., 2021).
The interpersonal significance is substantial. A compatible relationship does not require ideological agreement. It does require a sufficiently stable rule that the other person’s disagreement does not erase the other person’s moral status.
| Normal strong conviction | Extremist ideological pattern |
|---|---|
| “My belief is correct.” | “My belief is the only legitimate worldview.” |
| “You are wrong.” | “Your disagreement proves moral corruption or betrayal.” |
| “I want to persuade you.” | “You must submit or be corrected.” |
| “My community has values.” | “My community alone possesses moral legitimacy.” |
| “I oppose your politics.” | “Your political identity makes you an enemy.” |
| “Violence is wrong.” | “Violence becomes legitimate when directed at designated enemies.” |
| “My group can be criticized.” | “Criticism of the group is itself disloyalty.” |
The distinction is not intensity. It is the treatment of the moral and political status of the other person.
4. What Jihadists Believe In: The Ideological Architecture
The phrase what jihadists believe requires qualification. Jihadist organizations have differed in doctrine, strategy, leadership, and interpretation. It is therefore more accurate to identify recurring propositions in violent jihadist ideology rather than claim that every jihadist organization or sympathizer accepts every proposition identically.
Lahoud (2010) describes jihadist ideology as rejecting the contemporary international order of nation-states and seeking legitimacy in an exclusively religious framework. Bunzel (2015) describes the Islamic State’s ideology as a distinct form of jihadist-Salafism combining an absolutist religious interpretation with a program for political rule.
4.1 Absolute or exclusive religious authority
One recurring proposition is that legitimate political and social order must conform to the group’s interpretation of divine law.
The significance for psychological analysis is that political disagreement can become a matter of religious legitimacy rather than simply policy disagreement. An institution may therefore be rejected not because it has made a particular policy error but because its source of authority is considered fundamentally illegitimate.
4.2 Rejection of the modern nation-state
Lahoud (2010) identifies rejection of the contemporary nation-state system as a central feature of jihadist ideology. The argument is that national sovereignty, secular political authority, and international institutions cannot possess ultimate legitimacy where divine sovereignty is regarded as supreme.
This is different from ordinary criticism of government. A person may oppose a government while accepting the underlying legitimacy of the state and the rights of people who hold different views. The ideological issue becomes more significant where the political order itself is considered illegitimate and its replacement through religious rule is treated as necessary.
4.3 Caliphate and restoration of a religious-political order
The Islamic State provides the clearest contemporary example. Bunzel (2015) describes ISIS’s conception of a caliphate as a political-religious project embedded in its jihadist-Salafist ideology. Its objective was not merely to persuade people to adopt particular religious beliefs but to establish a territorial order governed according to its interpretation of Islamic law.
Consequently, ideology and governance became inseparable. The group sought to construct a society in which its theology determined law, social organization, punishment, gender relations, political authority, and acceptable conduct.
4.4 Wala’ and bara’: loyalty and separation
Lahoud’s analysis discusses wala’ and bara’ as concepts used within jihadist ideological discourse to conceptualize loyalty to those regarded as faithful and separation from those regarded as hostile, compromised, or outside the legitimate community.
Psychologically, the importance is the creation of relational hierarchy. The individual is taught not merely whom to love or avoid, but where loyalty should lie when personal relationships conflict with ideological commitments.
This raises a significant compatibility question:
When loyalty to an ideological group conflicts with loyalty to family, friendship, institutional obligation, or another person’s autonomy, which obligation takes precedence?
That question may be more informative than theological labels alone.
4.5 Takfir: policing the boundaries of belief
Takfir refers generally to declaring another person or group to be outside Islam or unbelieving. Within jihadist ideology, takfir has sometimes been used as a mechanism for delegitimizing Muslims who disagree with extremist interpretations.
Lahoud (2010) describes this dynamic as one of the weaknesses and internal contradictions of jihadist ideology: once purity becomes a major criterion of legitimacy, the movement can continually produce new categories of people alleged to have fallen outside the acceptable boundary.
The psychological consequence is potentially significant:
The enemy is no longer necessarily external.
The ideological system can begin policing fellow believers, former allies, relatives, or members of the same political movement.
4.6 Jihad as an individual obligation in some jihadist interpretations
Lahoud (2010) describes jihadist reinterpretations according to which participation in jihad can be presented as an individual obligation rather than something requiring authorization from a state or conventional religious-political authority.
The interpersonal significance is again the relocation of moral authority: the individual can come to regard the ideological cause as superior to ordinary institutional restraints.
4.7 Martyrdom and sacrificial meaning
Jihadist organizations have used martyrdom narratives to make self-sacrifice appear meaningful rather than merely destructive. The psychological mechanism is closely connected to the significance quest. Sacrifice becomes a means through which the individual can obtain recognition, religious meaning, collective status, or an imagined transcendent reward.
The important psychological point is that the individual is not necessarily thinking:
“I wish to die.”
The ideological narrative may instead transform death into:
“This sacrifice proves the meaning of my life.”
That transformation illustrates how Need and Narrative interact within the 3N model (Bélanger et al., 2019).
4.8 Apocalyptic and end-times beliefs
Apocalypticism is not uniformly emphasized by every jihadist organization. It has, however, been significant in Islamic State propaganda and in particular radicalization cases. Such beliefs can transform ordinary political time into an existential timetable: society is no longer simply troubled but understood to be approaching a decisive religious confrontation.
In psychological terms, this can reduce the perceived legitimacy of patience, compromise, gradual reform, and uncertainty.
4.9 Gender, family, and social order
Jihadist ideology can extend beyond political violence to a comprehensive conception of family and gender. Research on ISIS finds that the organization incorporated gender hierarchy into its conception of governance and used religious arguments to justify women’s subordination to prescribed domestic and social roles (Cook, 2023; Ghalwash, 2026).
This becomes relevant to interpersonal compatibility because ideology may govern not only public political beliefs but also marriage, education, authority within the family, freedom of movement, sexuality, child-rearing, and the distribution of decision-making power.
5. Case Study I: The Islamic State and the Integration of Belief, Authority, and Conduct
The Islamic State demonstrates particularly clearly how ideology can become a comprehensive social system.
Bunzel (2015) describes ISIS as a jihadist-Salafist movement whose ideological architecture combined an exclusivist interpretation of religion, strong anti-Shi’a sectarianism, severe application of Islamic law, and the establishment of a caliphate.
The significance of the case is that the organization’s ideological propositions did not remain theoretical. They were translated into governance.
| Ideological proposition | Institutional or behavioural implication |
|---|---|
| Exclusive religious authority | Religious interpretation becomes a source of political legitimacy |
| Caliphate | Political sovereignty is reorganized around the ideological project |
| Strict religious law | Personal and social behaviour becomes subject to ideological enforcement |
| Takfir | Religious disagreement can become grounds for exclusion |
| In-group loyalty | Group membership becomes a principal source of identity |
| Enemy construction | Certain groups are represented as existential threats |
| Martyrdom | Sacrifice becomes a source of status and meaning |
| Gender hierarchy | Family and social relations become governed by ideological rules |
The important lesson is not simply that ISIS was violent. That is descriptively obvious. The analytically significant point is how the organization’s worldview connected theology to governance and then governance to everyday behaviour.
This is precisely why “what does the person believe?” can be an insufficient question. A more revealing inquiry is:
“What would this belief system require the person to do if the person possessed sufficient authority to enforce it?”
The answer exposes the difference between an abstract belief and a governing ideology.
6. Case Study II: Ulu Tiram and Family-Based Ideological Socialization
The May 17, 2024, attack in Ulu Tiram, Malaysia provides a second case because it illustrates the movement of extremist ideology from political doctrine into the structure of family life.
Mustaffa (2025) describes the case in terms of Islamic State-linked extremism, family radicalization, social isolation, and doomsday beliefs.
The importance of the case for the present thesis lies in ideological socialization within an intimate network.
The family’s worldview reportedly became increasingly separated from ordinary social life. The extremist ideology was transmitted within the family rather than functioning solely as an external political commitment. Mustaffa’s account describes the use of education, family structure, and social isolation in an ideological environment that treated wider society as spiritually corrupt and connected violence with religious purification and salvation.
Conceptually, the progression is:
Ideological narrative → family authority → information control → social isolation → intensified ideological reinforcement → behavioural consequences.
This case demonstrates an important principle:
An ideology becomes more consequential when it ceases to be merely an opinion and begins governing the information, relationships, authority structures, and decisions of other people.
That distinction is highly relevant to compatibility. A person may privately hold controversial beliefs without imposing them upon others. A substantially different situation exists where ideological conviction becomes a basis for controlling whom one’s partner may meet, what children may learn, which information may be trusted, which communities are permissible, and whether disagreement is tolerated.
The case should not be generalized to religious families, homeschooling, social withdrawal, conservative households, or Muslims generally. None of those characteristics is specific to violent extremism. What distinguishes the case is the documented combination of extremist ideological allegiance, ideological isolation, and violent conduct.
7. Case Study III: Contemporary Digital Radicalization and Ideological Reinforcement
A further development concerns the digital environment. Ayad (2025) describes an unofficial online ecosystem surrounding the Islamic State involving numerous groups and outlets across social-media and messaging platforms, with younger supporters participating in the production and distribution of extremist material. His analysis describes the online environment as an ecosystem capable of sustaining ideological identity after the territorial collapse of the Islamic State.
The significance is that physical group absence does not necessarily eliminate group psychology.
A traditional extremist organization could depend heavily on geographical proximity. Digital networks can instead supply:
- ideological reinforcement;
- social recognition;
- group identity;
- shared symbols and narratives;
- continual exposure to propaganda;
- normalization of extremist language;
- and contact with like-minded individuals.
Kruglanski et al. (2021) describe the tendency of ideologically obsessed individuals to gravitate toward like-minded networks and note that interconnected networks can amplify adherence to violent extremism.
This produces a modern variation of the “network” component of the 3N model:
The individual no longer needs to live physically inside the extremist community to psychologically inhabit it.
For interpersonal analysis, the relevant question is therefore not simply whether someone “belongs to a group” in a formal organizational sense. It is whether their social-information environment has become ideologically closed and self-reinforcing.
8. Normal Psychology in Extreme Settings
The psychological literature repeatedly challenges the assumption that terrorists are necessarily psychopaths, clinically insane, or fundamentally unlike other human beings.
Borum (2004) emphasized the absence of a single psychological profile of terrorism. Later research similarly describes radicalization as a process involving ordinary cognitive and social mechanisms, including social identification, conformity, moral justification, perceived grievance, group belonging, and ideological commitment (Bélanger et al., 2019; Gómez et al., 2021).
This does not make extremist behavior ordinary in a moral sense. Rather, it means that extraordinary conduct can emerge from ordinary psychological mechanisms organized around extraordinary beliefs.
That distinction is central to the concept of ideological compatibility. A person does not need to be clinically abnormal to possess a worldview that creates profound incompatibility with another person’s values, autonomy, or safety.
The appropriate question is therefore not:
“Does this person appear psychologically normal?”
It is:
“What moral and ideological rules govern this person’s behavior when ordinary human interests conflict with ideological demands?”
9. Ideology: What Does the Belief System Actually Require?
Ideology should not be confused with ordinary religious devotion. Borum (2004) describes ideology in functional terms as a set of beliefs, values, principles, and goals that helps regulate behavior. His review distinguishes between extremist ideologies generally and those capable of supporting terrorism. The latter tend to possess behavioral mandates, claims to inviolability, and a perceived meaningful objective that can justify extreme action.
This yields a useful analytical proposition:
The important question is not merely what a person believes, but what the belief authorizes, prohibits, legitimizes, and demands.
An ideology becomes particularly consequential when it establishes rules concerning:
- who belongs to the moral community;
- who is regarded as an enemy;
- whether outsiders possess equal moral status;
- whether disagreement is legitimate;
- whether religious or political authority overrides civil or interpersonal obligations;
- whether coercion is legitimate;
- whether violence can be morally justified;
- and whether loyalty to the ideological cause supersedes loyalty to family, friends, institutions, or ordinary social norms.
These are not questions about theology in the abstract. They concern the behavioral consequences of doctrine.
10. Jihadist Ideology as a Case Study in Ideological Structure
The supplied article from the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point is particularly useful because it examines jihadism as an ideological system rather than simply as a collection of violent acts. Lahoud (2010) identifies several characteristics described by jihadist ideologues, including an idealized conception of a righteous cause, an exclusive conception of religious loyalty, rejection of the legitimacy of prevailing political institutions, and an interpretation of jihad as a mandatory response to perceived aggression.
The article also draws attention to the concepts of wala’ and bara’—loyalty to those regarded as members of the righteous community and dissociation from those regarded as having compromised the faith. In its discussion of takfir, Lahoud describes a further development in which perceived religious deviation can be treated as unbelief and, in the most extreme interpretations, used to legitimate violence even against fellow Muslims.
This is analytically important because it shows how boundary construction functions within an absolutist ideology. The significant feature is not merely that the ideology has an in-group. Most communities have some notion of membership. The more consequential feature is the possibility that disagreement is transformed into moral illegitimacy, and moral illegitimacy into permission for coercion or violence.
The same article differentiates jihadism from Islamism and emphasizes that the terminology should not be collapsed into a single category. It describes jihadist ideology as rejecting the legitimacy of the nation-state and prevailing political institutions and seeking legitimacy from an exclusively religious framework. This distinction matters because religious identity cannot validly be used as a proxy for jihadist ideology.
11. “Actions Speak Louder Than Words”: A Behavioral Test of Ideological Commitment
The proposition that actions speak louder than words is useful, but academically it requires refinement.
Words reveal declared commitments. Actions reveal operational commitments. Neither category is infallible.
A person may sincerely describe themselves as peaceful while repeatedly behaving coercively. Conversely, a person may hold an intellectually radical opinion while consistently refusing violence, coercion, or discrimination. Research on radicalization explicitly recognizes this distinction between ideological commitment and behavioral action (Gómez et al., 2021).
Borum (2004) therefore recommended a behavior-based focus in terrorism research rather than attempting to infer dangerousness from generalized psychological characteristics. This principle has broader relevance to interpersonal assessment: observable behavior should be examined as evidence, but not converted into unsupported psychological diagnosis or prediction.
The strongest method is consequently not:
Words versus actions.
It is:
Words → principles → decisions → repeated conduct → consequences.
The analytical question becomes whether these elements converge.
12. Ideological-Behavioural Congruence: The Central Test
A useful concept for interpersonal analysis is ideological-behavioural congruence: the extent to which a person’s repeated conduct corresponds to the moral principles the person claims to hold.
Consider the following:
| Claimed principle | Behavioural question |
|---|---|
| “All people possess dignity.” | Does the person extend dignity to people they strongly dislike? |
| “My faith is important to me.” | Does religious commitment involve personal practice or control of others? |
| “Family is sacred.” | Does the person protect family autonomy or use family loyalty as an instrument of control? |
| “Truth is important.” | Can the person acknowledge inconvenient facts concerning their own group? |
| “My ideology promotes justice.” | Are the same moral standards applied to allies and opponents? |
| “Violence is wrong.” | Is violence categorically rejected or justified when used by the in-group? |
| “I respect religious freedom.” | Can others practice another religion without coercion? |
| “I believe strongly.” | Can another person disagree without punishment or intimidation? |
The most revealing evidence is generated when two values come into conflict.
For example:
- personal relationship versus group loyalty;
- evidence versus ideological narrative;
- individual autonomy versus religious authority;
- universal morality versus in-group advantage;
- peaceful coexistence versus ideological victory.
A person’s actual priorities become more visible in these conflicts than in ordinary circumstances where all values point in the same direction.
13. The Relevant Behavioral Indicators
For purposes of ordinary interpersonal compatibility—not intelligence gathering or terrorist prediction—the most informative evidence concerns how ideology operates inside relationships.
13.1 Treatment of disagreement
One of the clearest indicators is the person’s response to disagreement. A pluralistic orientation permits another person to reject one’s beliefs without becoming morally illegitimate. An authoritarian or absolutist orientation may interpret disagreement as disloyalty, corruption, betrayal, or hostility.
The relevant observation is therefore not whether the person argues strongly. It is whether disagreement remains disagreement or becomes moral condemnation.
13.2 Treatment of outsiders
Another important indicator concerns the person’s treatment of people outside their perceived in-group. The extremist pattern described in the literature involves increasingly categorical distinctions between “us” and “them,” sometimes accompanied by dehumanization or moral exclusion (Borum, 2004; Bélanger et al., 2019).
Accordingly, the practical question is:
Can the person recognize the rights and dignity of people whom they regard as religiously, politically, culturally, or morally wrong?
13.3 Relationship between belief and coercion
A significant difference exists between saying:
“I believe people should live according to my values.”
and:
“Other people must be compelled to live according to my values.”
Compatibility is affected considerably by this distinction. The latter indicates that the ideology has moved from personal conviction to an asserted authority over others.
13.4 Attitude toward violence
The most consequential distinction concerns violence itself. Borum (2004) notes that not every extremist ideology promotes violence and not every extremist becomes violent. The relevant question is therefore whether violence is categorically rejected or whether it is considered legitimate under ideological conditions.
A person who says violence is regrettable but sometimes justified raises a different analytical question from someone who explicitly rejects violence against civilians, collective punishment, vigilantism, and ideological violence as principles.
13.5 Moral flexibility and accountability
Another important indicator is whether the person applies one moral standard universally or adopts different rules for the in-group and out-group. Moral double standards are not unique to extremists, but their systematic use can indicate that group identity is overriding general moral principles.
Likewise, accountability matters. Can the person acknowledge wrongdoing by their own ideological community, or is criticism of the in-group automatically dismissed as hostility?
13.6 Centrality of the ideological identity
Not every belief has equal psychological importance. The question is whether the ideology is one value among many or the dominant organizing principle of the person’s life.
Gómez et al. (2021) describe identity internalization and collective identity as potentially important mechanisms through which individuals become deeply attached to violent groups. The interpersonal concern arises when ideological identity becomes sufficiently dominant that ordinary relationships, reciprocal obligations, or personal judgment are subordinated to group demands.
14. What Should Not Be Treated as Evidence
A rigorous framework must identify false positives as carefully as it identifies concerning evidence.
The following characteristics should not, by themselves, be treated as evidence of jihadist ideology:
| Characteristic | Why it is insufficient by itself |
|---|---|
| Muslim identity | Describes religious identity, not violent ideology |
| Religious observance | Can exist within peaceful and pluralistic religious life |
| Conservative theology | Theological conservatism does not equal jihadism |
| Religious dress | Appearance does not establish political ideology |
| Mosque attendance | Places of worship are not evidence of violent affiliation |
| Criticism of Western foreign policy | Political criticism is not jihadist commitment |
| Sympathy for populations experiencing war or discrimination | Humanitarian concern is not extremist ideology |
| Opposition to secularism | Philosophical opposition does not necessarily imply violence |
| Belief in religious law | The meaning and intended application of such belief must be examined |
| Social withdrawal | Has many non-extremist explanations |
| Association with Muslims | Religious or ethnic association is not ideological evidence |
| Strong disagreement | Conflict is not necessarily extremism |
The literature explicitly rejects the existence of a single reliable terrorist profile. Borum (2004) states that people become terrorists through different pathways and that there is no accurate psychological profile of the terrorist.
This limitation is not merely politically or socially important; it is methodological.
A proxy is not the same thing as evidence.
An observable characteristic should only be treated as relevant when there is a defensible behavioral connection to the question being investigated.
15. Evidence: From Weak Signals to Stronger Evidence of Ideological Practice
A second useful distinction is between weak, intermediate, and strong evidence, while avoiding a numerical scoring system that would imply scientific precision that the research does not support.
| Evidence category | Examples | Interpretation |
|---|---|---|
| Weak / nonspecific | Dress, religious observance, political dissatisfaction, conservative values | Little evidentiary value regarding jihadist commitment |
| Contextual | Repeated narratives about persecution, grievance, distrust, social isolation | Relevant to worldview but not sufficient |
| Substantive ideological evidence | Explicit endorsement of jihadist doctrines, systematic takfir, rejection of equal moral status, advocacy of ideological coercion | Stronger evidence of ideological commitment |
| Behavioural evidence | Repeated coercive conduct justified by ideology; systematic dehumanization; ideological enforcement over others | Evidence that doctrine is influencing conduct |
| Direct organizational evidence | Documented affiliation, allegiance, participation, or material support for a violent extremist organization | Strong evidence of involvement, subject to factual verification |
| Conduct demonstrating violence | Actual participation in ideologically motivated violence | Demonstrated behaviour, not merely belief |
The distinction is essential because research now provides direct empirical support for the gap between ideological commitment and violent behaviour (Callahan & Rosenfeld, 2025).
A person should therefore not be categorized as violent merely because they possess radical opinions. Conversely, a person should not be considered ideologically harmless merely because they describe themselves as peaceful if their repeated conduct contradicts that declaration.
16. The Central Question: Are They Practicing the Ideology?
The phrase “Are they practicing such ideology?” can be made analytically precise.
A person is more plausibly practicing an ideology when the ideology repeatedly functions as a decision rule.
The test can be framed through seven questions:
| Question | What is being tested? |
|---|---|
| What does the person believe? | Ideological content |
| What authority does the person assign to that belief? | Degree of normative authority |
| What does the belief require of the believer? | Behavioural mandate |
| What does it permit toward outsiders? | Moral boundaries |
| What happens when someone disagrees? | Tolerance and relational authority |
| Does the person impose the belief on others? | Coercive extension |
| Does repeated conduct conform to the ideology? | Ideological-behavioural congruence |
This leads to a more rigorous concept of practice:
An ideology is being practiced when it functions not merely as an abstract proposition but as a recurring rule for interpreting events, governing relationships, making decisions, assigning moral status, or authorizing conduct.
The existence of the belief is therefore only the first layer. The more significant question is what the belief actually does.
17. Compatibility Is Ultimately a Question of Governance of the Relationship
The deepest issue is not whether two people agree about religion or politics. People can maintain successful relationships despite substantial differences in metaphysical, political, or theological beliefs.
The more fundamental question is:
What happens to the relationship when the two people disagree?
An individual’s ideology becomes materially relevant to compatibility when it determines how they believe another person may be treated.
A person may hold a very strong worldview while accepting:
“You are free to disagree with me, govern your own life, maintain your own beliefs, and remain entitled to dignity.”
A substantially different orientation is:
“Because my worldview is ultimately true, your disagreement is evidence that you are morally defective, disloyal, or subject to correction.”
The distinction is not theological. It is relational.
In this respect, ideological compatibility can be conceptualized as a question of shared rules of coexistence.
| Compatibility dimension | Central question |
|---|---|
| Autonomy | Can each person make legitimate choices concerning their own life? |
| Disagreement | Can disagreement exist without punishment or intimidation? |
| Dignity | Does the person recognize the moral status of outsiders and opponents? |
| Authority | Does ideological authority override interpersonal consent? |
| Coercion | Does the person believe others may be compelled to conform? |
| Group loyalty | Does group loyalty supersede personal relationships? |
| Accountability | Can the person recognize wrongdoing by their own group? |
| Pluralism | Can different beliefs coexist without one group’s domination? |
| Violence | Is ideological violence rejected, tolerated, celebrated, or justified? |
| Family governance | Are partners and children treated as autonomous persons or ideological subjects? |
18. Why Family Relationships Are Especially Revealing
Family relationships expose ideology under conditions in which abstract beliefs encounter concrete obligations.
A person may claim to value freedom but attempt to control a spouse’s clothing.
A person may claim to value family but use family honour to restrict a partner’s friendships.
A person may claim to respect religious choice but attempt to compel a partner’s religious observance.
A person may claim to value children but treat education primarily as ideological transmission rather than intellectual development.
Such contradictions are not automatically evidence of jihadism. They may arise from patriarchy, authoritarianism, insecurity, cultural traditionalism, or ordinary interpersonal dysfunction. The point is analytical: the same behavioural pattern can have different causes, and ideology should not be inferred without evidence.
Where an explicit extremist doctrine is also present, however, the relationship between ideology and conduct becomes materially more informative.
The Ulu Tiram case illustrates the extreme version of this phenomenon because ideological authority was reportedly embedded within the family environment itself (Mustaffa, 2025).
19. Mental Illness: An Important Negative Finding
The original argument correctly emphasized that jihadist or terrorist involvement should not simply be attributed to mental illness. The point can now be stated more precisely.
Sarma et al. (2022) synthesized 56 papers involving 73 terrorist samples and found a lifetime prevalence estimate for diagnosed mental disorder of 17.4% among the relevant terrorist samples, while the authors concluded that the evidence did not support the assertion that terrorist populations are characterized by higher rates of mental health difficulties than the general population. They also noted substantial methodological limitations and cautioned that the conclusions remain tentative.
This does not mean mental illness can never be relevant in an individual case. The authors specifically acknowledge that mental health problems may matter in particular cases when understood within a broader psychosocial context.
The academically safer formulation is therefore:
Mental illness is neither a necessary nor a sufficient explanation for violent extremism; ideological, social, motivational, and situational processes must be examined separately.
This distinction protects against two opposite errors: romanticizing extremists as perfectly rational and pathologizing them as inherently mentally abnormal.
20. A Multilevel Model of Radicalization
The recent literature supports a multilevel conception of radicalization rather than a one-dimensional model.
| Level | Relevant factors | Analytical meaning |
|---|---|---|
| Micro | Identity, significance, intolerance, hostile attitudes, moral disengagement, ideological beliefs | Individual psychological and cognitive processes |
| Meso | Family, peers, social isolation, extremist networks, group identity | Social reinforcement and belonging |
| Macro | Conflict, political grievances, perceived discrimination, institutional legitimacy, geopolitical events | Broader environment and available narratives |
Pandey and Behera (2026) place many of these factors across micro-, meso-, and macro-level categories and emphasize that radicalization is influenced by their interaction rather than by a single cause.
This model also explains why a purely individualistic approach is inadequate.
The question is not simply:
“What is wrong with this person?”
It is:
“What interaction between psychological need, ideological narrative, social network, and surrounding environment has made this worldview meaningful and behaviourally consequential?”
21. An Integrated Model: Mentality → Ideology → Network → Conduct
The complete framework can now be represented as a chain:
Mentality
The person seeks significance, belonging, certainty, identity, justice, status, or explanation.
↓
Ideology
The person encounters an absolute narrative explaining why the world is unjust and identifying legitimate and illegitimate groups.
↓
Network
The narrative is socially reinforced through peers, family, leaders, online communities, or organizations.
↓
Moral transformation
The ideology provides a justification for conduct that ordinary moral norms might otherwise inhibit.
↓
Behaviour
The person begins making decisions consistent with the ideological framework.
↓
Reinforcement
The conduct strengthens identity, group belonging, and ideological commitment.
This should not be interpreted as a deterministic pathway. Most people exposed to grievances, ideology, or extremist material do not progress toward violence. The model explains mechanisms, not inevitability.
22. The “Actions Versus Words” Problem Reframed as an Evidentiary Problem
The debate can therefore be restated more scientifically.
It is not:
Words or actions?
It is:
Which combination of evidence best demonstrates the person’s operative value system?
A useful evidentiary hierarchy is:
Self-description
→ what the person says.
Pattern of expression
→ what the person repeatedly says.
Normative reasoning
→ what principles the person uses to justify decisions.
Behaviour under ordinary conditions
→ how the person normally acts.
Behaviour under conflict
→ what happens when values collide.
Behaviour under loss of control
→ whether autonomy of others continues to be respected.
Longitudinal consistency
→ whether the same principles recur over time.
Independent corroboration
→ whether important claims are supported by observable evidence.
The further the evidence progresses down this sequence, the more directly it bears upon what the person actually practices.
This does not make statements irrelevant. Indeed, statements are essential for establishing the connection between conduct and ideology. Conduct without ideological context may demonstrate aggression, but it may not establish why the conduct occurred.
Thus:
Words identify the claimed rule; actions reveal whether the rule governs behaviour.
23. Contradictions Are Often More Informative Than Simple Consistency
An important extension of the framework is the analysis of contradiction.
Suppose a person claims:
“Everyone deserves dignity.”
but repeatedly humiliates people they regard as inferior.
Or:
“Violence is wrong.”
but celebrates violence committed by their ideological allies.
Or:
“Everyone should be free to practice their religion.”
but insists that close family members must conform to their own religious requirements.
The contradiction does not prove jihadist ideology. It demonstrates something more general: the stated universal principle may not actually govern the person’s behaviour.
The analytical question then becomes:
Which principle wins when principles conflict?
| Stated value | Competing value | Observed priority |
|---|---|---|
| Equality | In-group advantage | Which one prevails? |
| Autonomy | Ideological conformity | Which one prevails? |
| Truth | Group loyalty | Which one prevails? |
| Nonviolence | Revenge | Which one prevails? |
| Family | Ideological authority | Which one prevails? |
| Compassion | Punishment of outsiders | Which one prevails? |
| Law | Ideological obligation | Which one prevails? |
A thesis-style assessment should therefore examine value hierarchy, not merely declared values.
24. What Makes an Ideology Interpersonally Incompatible?
The strongest concern arises when an ideology establishes an asymmetrical moral relationship between the believer and other people.
The pattern can be conceptualized as:
“I possess the truth.”
becoming:
“Because I possess the truth, I possess superior moral authority.”
which becomes:
“Because I possess superior moral authority, I may determine how others should live.”
and ultimately, in the most extreme systems:
“Those who resist may legitimately be coerced, excluded, or harmed.”
The first proposition is common to many religions and political philosophies.
The second can still occur within ordinary ideological life.
The third concerns authoritarianism and coercion.
The fourth is the crucial transition into violent extremist reasoning.
Accordingly, the existence of absolute belief should not itself be treated as disqualifying. The critical question is whether the belief claims an unlimited right to govern other people.
25. A Practical Qualitative Framework for Interpersonal Assessment
The following framework allows the evidence to be organized without pretending that a numerical “extremism score” can scientifically determine a person’s character.
| Domain | Questions to investigate |
|---|---|
| Doctrine | What does the person explicitly believe? |
| Authority | Who or what has the final authority over their conduct? |
| Out-group | How do they describe people outside their ideological community? |
| Dissent | What happens when someone disagrees? |
| Coercion | Do they believe others should be compelled to conform? |
| Violence | Is violence rejected categorically or justified conditionally? |
| Takfir / exclusion | Do they routinely classify dissenters as morally illegitimate? |
| Family | Does ideology determine the autonomy and status of partners or children? |
| Information | Can trusted outsiders challenge the worldview? |
| Accountability | Can they condemn their own group’s wrongdoing? |
| Conduct | Do repeated actions correspond with stated doctrine? |
| Change | Can the person revise beliefs in response to evidence? |
This approach should remain evidence-based rather than impressionistic. No one characteristic is decisive in isolation.
26. Final Synthesis: From Belief to Practice
The literature supports a model in which extremist involvement may arise from the interaction of psychological needs, ideological narratives, and social networks. The 3N model is particularly useful because it explains how a search for significance can become connected to a narrative that legitimizes violence and then reinforced through a like-minded network (Bélanger et al., 2019).
Jihadist ideology adds a distinctive substantive layer in cases where it rejects prevailing political legitimacy, elevates a particular interpretation of divine authority, establishes rigid in-group boundaries, uses concepts such as takfir to police those boundaries, and can legitimate coercion or violence against designated enemies (Lahoud, 2010; Bunzel, 2015).
The psychological literature, however, provides an equally important qualification: radical belief and violent conduct are not synonymous. The 2025 empirical study directly examining the belief-behaviour gap found that ideological commitment did not generally predict violent plot involvement or direct violence across its full extremist sample, even though it was associated with other radical behaviours and showed stronger associations within its jihadist-inspired subgroup (Callahan & Rosenfeld, 2025).
Therefore, the phrase “actions speak louder than words” should be reformulated:
Actions are evidence of operative values, while words are evidence of declared values; the strongest conclusion arises when repeated conduct, stated principles, ideological commitments, and social relationships converge.
For interpersonal compatibility, the most important issue is not whether a person is religious, politically radical, deeply traditional, socially conservative, secular, or ideologically committed. Nor is it whether the person can quote peaceful principles.
The decisive issue is the governing rule of coexistence.
Does the person believe:
“You can disagree with me and remain fully entitled to your beliefs, autonomy, dignity, and safety.”
Or does their worldview imply:
“Because I possess the truth, your disagreement reduces your moral legitimacy and creates an obligation to correct, control, exclude, or punish you.”
That distinction goes to the heart of ideological compatibility.
A person may hold strong beliefs while remaining pluralistic. A person may hold unconventional or radical opinions while remaining nonviolent. A person may be sincerely religious while recognizing that other people possess equal moral standing. Conversely, a person may use ordinary religious or moral vocabulary while practicing a profoundly coercive system of interpersonal authority.
Accordingly, compatibility should be assessed from the person’s operative rules, not merely from their declared identity.
The strongest analytical test is:
What does this person believe, what authority do they give that belief, what does that belief permit them to do to other people, and what do they repeatedly do when another person refuses to conform?
That is where mentality becomes ideology, ideology becomes practice, and practice becomes observable evidence.
References
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